Thông tin chung
  English
  Đề tài NC khoa học
  Bài báo, báo cáo khoa học
  Hướng dẫn Sau đại học
  Sách và giáo trình
  Các học phần và môn giảng dạy
  Giải thưởng khoa học, Phát minh, sáng chế
  Khen thưởng
  Thông tin khác
  Tài liệu tham khảo
  Hiệu chỉnh
 
Số người truy cập: 107,018,720

 Incentivizing Energy Reduction for Emergency Demand Response in Multi-Tenant Mixed-Use Buildings
Tác giả hoặc Nhóm tác giả: Nguyen H. Tran, Chuan Pham, Minh N. H. Nguyen, Shaolei Ren, Choong Seon Hong
Nơi đăng: IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, DOI: 10.1109/TSG.2016.2639033; Số: Vol.9, No.4;Từ->đến trang: 3701- 3715;Năm: 2018
Lĩnh vực: Công nghệ thông tin; Loại: Bài báo khoa học; Thể loại: Quốc tế
TÓM TẮT
Emergency demand response, which is the last line of defense to avoid cascading failures during emergency events, has witnessed numerous crucial participants, including buildings and datacenters. However, even though the majority of datacenters are physically located in mixed-use buildings (MUBs), the existing studies on emergency demand response are non-coordinated approaches that separately focus on either buildings or datacenters, hence ignoring that both datacenters and non-datacenter (e.g., office) operations share the same MUB facilities (e.g., electricity supply). Furthermore, even when all MUB tenants (i.e., offices and datacenters) are jointly considered, tenants will incur different costs to shed energy for emergency demand response, thereby raising an issue of mis-aligned incentive for their participation. To overcome this non-coordinated energy shedding and mis-aligned incentives, we propose two incentive mechanisms in MUBs, such that the total incurred cost is minimized for energy shedding. The first mechanism, namely MECH-NA, is designed for non-strategic MUB tenants. In MECH-NA, the MUB operator provides a mechanism package including reward rate and a commitment profile with deviation penalty, based on which the MUB tenants will shed energy to maximize the reward and minimize their energy-shedding and deviation costs. We also design a distributed algorithm to implement MECH-NA that can achieve the minimum MUB cost. The second mechanism, namely MECH-SA, is a VCG-Kellybased mechanism tailored to handle strategic MUB tenants. In MECH-SA, the operator announces both reward and energy shedding rules, based on which the tenants strategically participate in an bidding game. For this game, we not only show that there exists an efficient Nash equilibrium at which the total MUB cost is achieved, but also design a distributed algorithm to implement MECH-SA. Simulation results show that both MECH-NA and MECH-SA can obtain the optimal MUB cost, which outperforms partially or non-coordinated approaches.
ABSTRACT
Emergency demand response, which is the last line of defense to avoid cascading failures during emergency events, has witnessed numerous crucial participants, including buildings and datacenters. However, even though the majority of datacenters are physically located in mixed-use buildings (MUBs), the existing studies on emergency demand response are non-coordinated approaches that separately focus on either buildings or datacenters, hence ignoring that both datacenters and non-datacenter (e.g., office) operations share the same MUB facilities (e.g., electricity supply). Furthermore, even when all MUB tenants (i.e., offices and datacenters) are jointly considered, tenants will incur different costs to shed energy for emergency demand response, thereby raising an issue of mis-aligned incentive for their participation. To overcome this non-coordinated energy shedding and mis-aligned incentives, we propose two incentive mechanisms in MUBs, such that the total incurred cost is minimized for energy shedding. The first mechanism, namely MECH-NA, is designed for non-strategic MUB tenants. In MECH-NA, the MUB operator provides a mechanism package including reward rate and a commitment profile with deviation penalty, based on which the MUB tenants will shed energy to maximize the reward and minimize their energy-shedding and deviation costs. We also design a distributed algorithm to implement MECH-NA that can achieve the minimum MUB cost. The second mechanism, namely MECH-SA, is a VCG-Kellybased mechanism tailored to handle strategic MUB tenants. In MECH-SA, the operator announces both reward and energy shedding rules, based on which the tenants strategically participate in an bidding game. For this game, we not only show that there exists an efficient Nash equilibrium at which the total MUB cost is achieved, but also design a distributed algorithm to implement MECH-SA. Simulation results show that both MECH-NA and MECH-SA can obtain the optimal MUB cost, which outperforms partially or non-coordinated approaches.
© Đại học Đà Nẵng
 
 
Địa chỉ: 41 Lê Duẩn Thành phố Đà Nẵng
Điện thoại: (84) 0236 3822 041 ; Email: dhdn@ac.udn.vn